The AFC Iraq Fund Class D shares returned −2.4% in July with a NAV of USD 607.03 which is an outperformance versus its benchmark, the Rabee Securities RSISX USD Index (RSISUSD index) which returned −4.4% for the month. Year to date the RSISUSD is down −4.0% while the fund is up +3.3% YTD.
The market’s action in July was so quiet that it turned activities like watching paint dry into spectator sports, as the start of the peak summer and holiday season depressed trading volumes. Nonetheless, the average daily turnover’s decline of −15% month-on-month did not erase the turnover gains made in the prior two months, small as they were.
The highlight of the month, though, was the release of the latest IMF country report for Iraq, in which the IMF updated its estimates, last made in the summer of 2017, for both the future economic outlook and for the last few years. The changes to its GDP growth estimates for the crisis years 2014-2017 were as follows:
Year
|
2014
|
2015
|
2016
|
2017
|
Old estimates
|
+0.7%
|
+4.8%
|
+11.0%
|
-0.4%
|
New estimates
|
+0.7%
|
+2.5%
|
+15.2%
|
-2.5%
|
While estimates for the years following the conflict changed as follows:
Year
|
2018
|
2019
|
2020
|
2021
|
Old estimates
|
+2.9%
|
+1.7%
|
+2.0%
|
+2.1%
|
New estimates
|
-0.6%
|
+4.6%
|
+5.3%
|
+2.6%
|
The main takeaway is that the crisis years were, on the whole, weaker than initially expected. Although 2018, the first year following the conflict, was the second year of a deep recession with a contraction of -0.6% on the back of the prior year’s -2.5% decline, instead of it being the first year of an economic recovery, at +2.9%, following a shallower decline of -0.4% -a message telegraphed by companies listed on the Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) over the last two years. On the other hand, the expected recovery in 2019/2020 is now estimated to be much stronger with GDP growing at +4.6%/+5.3% instead of +1.7%/+2.0%.
Higher oil exports and the improved oil pricing environment over the last two years has resulted in much higher government revenues than estimated earlier from 2017 onwards. This, with a long lag, is initially translating into increased consumer spending in 2019, given that the government employs over 50% of the working population. This would then be followed by the government’s investment spending powering the non-oil economy. Subsequently, the IMF’s new assumptions on non-oil GDP growth rates are crucial for the economy and the stock market. The IMF’s estimates for the severe contraction in non-oil GDP during the crisis years changed as follows:
Year
|
2014
|
2015
|
2016
|
2017
|
Old estimates
|
-3.9%
|
-9.6%
|
-8.1%
|
+1.5%
|
New estimates
|
-3.9%
|
-14.4%
|
+1.3%
|
-0.6%
|
Accordingly, the downward trajectory in 2015 was much steeper at −14.4% than earlier estimates of −9.6%, while the stability expected for 2017 was a double dip recession following the bounce in 2016. The contraction also lasted longer, at four years, as opposed to earlier expectations of three years. Estimates for the years following the conflict therefore changed as follows:
Year
|
2018
|
2019
|
2020
|
2021
|
Old estimates
|
+2.0%
|
+3.0%
|
+3.9%
|
+4.0%
|
New estimates
|
+0.8%
|
+5.4%
|
+5.0%
|
+4.1%
|
Confirming the earlier message that 2018 was the second year in a contraction with the non-oil GDP dragging the overall GDP down, negating the strong contributions of higher oil prices and exports to the overall GDP growth. Subsequently, the expected recovery for 2019/2020 would be much stronger at +5.4%/+5.0% versus earlier estimates of +3.0%/+3.9%. The changes for outlook for non-oil GDP growth are consistent with the analysis, made here over the last few months, of the drag on the economy in 2018 and early 2019 as a result of the political paralysis before, during, and after the May 2018 parliamentary elections. This paralysis only ended in March as the 2019 budget was only passed into law in late February 2019.
Furthermore, the IMF estimates that non-oil investment spending for 2019 would be about USD 11.25 bln, or an +8.5% stimulus to the new non-oil GDP estimate for 2019. It’s unlikely that the government would be able to spend all of the budgeted amount in 2019, given the slow nature of investment spending, and the government’s historic under-execution of such spending. This probably explains the IMF’s estimates for investment spending at about 13.5% less than that projected by the 2019 government budget.
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