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The first of the three developments was the massive anti-government demonstrations in Iran that began in the last days of 2025, and expanded significantly throughout early January to become the most-significant anti-government demonstrations since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979, before a bloody crackdown seemed to end them, or at least for now. Unlike prior protests, this was a protest that erupted in the bazar, traditionally conservative and loyal to the regime, whose joining the then ongoing massive anti-government protests in 1979 played a major factor in ending the prior regime. Consequently, raising fears of a significant political instability in Iran, which were magnified by U.S. threats to the regime, and the build-up of President Trump’s “beautiful armada”. All of which come with potentially negative consequences for the region, and especially for Iraq, which shares a 1,600 km border with Iran, close political, and economic ties.
The second of the three developments was the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki as the new Prime Minister (PM) designate, part of the ongoing government formation, who was the sitting PM in June 2014 when ISIS took over the country’s second largest city. The choice was controversial as the nominee was viewed as being largely responsible for the sectarian tensions in the country during his two tenures as PM, from 2006-2014, that eventually led to the rise of ISIS. The U.S. administration reacted negatively to this nomination, viewing it as a pro-Iran development, and issued threats that included measures which could negatively affect Iraq’s access to its oil revenues and foreign reserves. While the fears over access to oil revenues and foreign reserves are overblown, rooted in misunderstandings, U.S. threats to Iraq are a negative development.
The final of the three developments was the government’s implementation, at the start of 2026, of long-overdue customs tariffs, part of its plans for increasing non-oil revenues, that was made possible following the automation and digitisation of tariff collection processes over the prior months. While the implementation is an aspect of the cumulative positive effects of relative stability that leads to more efficient government processes, local importers reacted negatively as this implementation was linked to affecting cross-border transfers by these importers. Thus, essentially linked to the Central Bank of Iraq’s (CBI) implementation in November 2022, of its then new procedural requirements for the provisioning of U.S. dollars (USD) for importers; which subsequently was a crucial factor in the acceleration of the secular transformation of the economy towards formality and banking. However, the move towards formality is a multi-year process, and as such, the still informal section of importers faced difficulties in effecting cross-border transfers, leading to greater demand for USD in the parallel market. This led to an increase in the delta of the parallel market exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar (IQD) versus the USD over the official exchange rate. The delta spiked in late January 2026 in response to the US threats but has since subsided somewhat (chart below). While the increase in the delta is a negative development, in that it has effects on the economy and access to foreign goods, the increase only brought the delta to levels that prevailed at the end of 2024 –and thus part of the delta’s long-term decline as the economy moves towards much increased formality and banking adoption.
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