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Outlook for 2026
The headwinds of weaker oil prices should continue to dampen but not derail the dynamics fuelling the economy’s secular transformation, which would continue to unfold in 2026 as much as they did in 2023-25 and, in the same way, drive the market’s performance. Supporting this assertion is the expected rebound in non-oil GDP growth, which is projected to grow by 1.5% in 2026, and a further 2.5% in 2027 (i).
Two key factors will come into focus throughout the year and beyond. The first is the growth trajectory of the top banks in the country, whose fortunes brightened considerably following the introduction of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI)’s updated regulations on foreign transfers in November 2022. These, then, fast-tracked the economy’s adoption of banking and the move to formality, that disproportionally benefited these banks, who subsequently experienced exceptional quarter-on-quarter, and year-over-year growth for the first two years. While this heady growth, as expected, moderated meaningfully over the last few quarters, the follow-up raft of measures introduced by the CBI in 2025 will further positively impact their fortunes. The most significant of which is the multi-year comprehensive banking sector overhaul, taking effect in late 2025, which aims to modernise the sector, align it with international best practices, and attract direct international institutional investments into the sector. The effect of these measures will unfold over a number of years, nevertheless, they will have an equally profound effect on the banking sector as those of the November 2022 regulations, and just like them, will disproportionally benefit the top quality banks.
Consequently, a “new normal” for the banking sector will begin to take shape in 2026, in which the future growth trajectories of the top banks will be from a higher base and from a significantly improved financial position. This new normal will be marked by an accelerated adoption of banking and of formality, coupled with an acceleration of the move away from the dominance of cash and informality –developments that the AFC Iraq Fund’s investment thesis for the banking sector contends would come with growth in credit, resulting in an expansion of the money circulating in the economy and consequently to a meaningful increase in non-oil GDP. Over time, this should support the growth in top banks’ earnings, and ultimately feed into higher stock market valuations –driven by earnings growth and by the increases in market multiples placed upon these earnings.
The second key factor will be the effect of lower oil prices on government spending, and subsequently on the non-oil economy, given the central role of government expenditures. Current market expectations are that Brent crude price for 2026-27 will average 12.4% lower than that for 2025, or 25.7% lower than that of 2023-24(iii). Thus, all things being equal, the upcoming government will not have the wherewithal to meet its planned expenditures without the need for substantial debt issuance to augment its declining oil revenues. Over the next few years, the much-increased need for sovereign debt will play a big role in developing the country’s bond market, subsequently contributing to the equity market’s develoepment. Ultimately, this will bring with it “bond market discipline” that has the potential to positively influence the structural imbalances between current and investment spending that were perpetuated in every budget over the last two decades.
With the end of 2025, the over-arching theme, remains the same as that highlighted at the end of the prior year, i.e., that both of the two key dynamics discussed –the cumulative positive effects of the relative stability and structural banking developments– are in the early stages of their transformation of the Iraqi economy, a process that would unfold over the next few years, bringing with it high economic growth that would feed into higher corporate profits, and ultimately higher stock market returns. We believe that the fund’s holdings stand to capture these returns in the next few years in the same way that they did in 2023-25.
However, risks remain given Iraq’s recent history of conflict, extreme leverage to volatile oil prices, as well as the real risk that a sustained crash in oil prices, of two years or more, will derail the economy’s secular transformation. However, there is no indication that such a sustained crash is on the horizon.
Note:
- Non-oil GDP figures for 2023, estimates for 2024, and projections for 2025-27 are those of IMF Iraq Article IV report 25/83 published in July 2025.
- Brent crude prices are sourced from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), as of 31st December 2025.
- Market expectations are based on Brent crude long term futures contrast sourced from investing.com as of 31st December 2025.
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